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MUST A MEDIATOR BE NEUTRAL?
YOU’D BETTER BELIEVE IT!*
JOSEPH B. STULBERG

**

I. INTRODUCTION
Have solution; what’s your problem?
If that were the business card of a professional mediator, do not hire
her. If that were the card of a skillful consultant, secure her services.
Why does that answer seem straightforward, but yet mediators
remain divided about whether a mediator must be neutral with regard to
the outcomes that parties embrace?
I am perplexed. In my judgment, if we want to use mediation to help
persons resolve conflicts because we believe, centrally, that participating
in mediation is, and should be, a justice event, then mediator neutrality
is required.
In this Article, I want to advance and defend two claims: a mediator
must be neutral because justice demands it; and, empirically, a mediator
can, in fact, be neutral in the required way. Each claim has been
disparaged by practitioners and scholars. If the critics are correct, then
1
there is no principled basis for distinguishing the mediator’s

* This title, of course, deliberately plays off the remarkably important article by
Professor Ronald Dworkin entitled Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 87 (1996). While I—and most other mortals—can only aspire to match his
standard of excellence in terms of intellectual insight governing a particular topic, I hope that
by borrowing his title, I can display a comparable passion both for the topic under review and
one’s belief about how important it is to get our thinking right about it.
** John W. Bricker Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
I wish to thank Professors Andrea K. Schneider, Peter Salem, and Susan Yates for inviting
me to participate in their important symposium and to join Professor Lawrence Susskind in
revisiting our Vermont Law Review exchange. In addition, I would like to thank Theodore
Greeley, Editor in Chief, and the editorial staff of the Marquette Law Review for their
support in bringing this Article to fruition. Finally, I wish to acknowledge publicly my deep
admiration and respect for my long-time friend and professional colleague, Professor
Susskind; his contributions to our field are stimulating, rich, and sustained, and it is always a
pleasure to be in his company.
1. Professor Susskind has stated that he and others such as Professor Howard Raiffa do
not refer to the mediator as a “neutral intervener,” but as the “n+1,” where “n” stands for the
number of participating stakeholders and “n+1” is the intervener. Lawrence Susskind,
Professor, MIT, Remarks at the 30th Anniversary Conference: The Mediator and Public
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participation from that of a bully or a philosopher king. And if that is
so, then thoughtful citizens should widely criticize government agencies,
courts, and other institutions that promote or mandate mediation’s use.
But, I will argue, if the mediator is neutral, then the mediation process
itself constitutes both an important justice event as well as a crucial
methodology in a rule-of-law regime for non-violently securing or
advancing individual dignity and freedom.
I believe, then, that much is at stake in the debate about mediator
neutrality. I recognize this is a complex subject. It invites spirited
debate and deserves careful, thorough analysis. I may not do it justice,
but I want to try. The danger of such discussions is that comments are
often crafted at an abstract level divorced from practical applications. I
want to try to avoid that pitfall by proceeding first with an examination
of the contexts and challenges in which the question of mediator
neutrality arises and then examine why the question about mediator
neutrality is of interest.
II. MEDIATION AS A JUSTICE EVENT
I think of mediation as a process for displaying and promoting
justice. Certainly in the public domain, we design and advocate its use
as a legitimate way of promoting the resolution of controversies among
citizens in a political community.
Consider the following civic controversy: church members object to
the activity of a striptease club located next door. Its members engage
in various protest activities, from lying down in the parking lot to taking
pictures of patrons and posting them to a website. The business owner
and some of the business’s patrons respond by standing in the club
parking lot on Sunday mornings before announced worship services
carrying large picket signs depicting men and women fornicating; these
signs, of course, are easily visible to all parishioners, including children,
as they enter their church. The parties agree to resolve their matters
through mediation. I believe that they are both looking for—and are
entitled to—a process that is fair in form and outcome. They are not

Policy,
Vermont
Law
School
(Oct.
12,
2011),
available
at
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/academics/dispute_resolution_program.htm; see also HOWARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 23 (1982) (defining a mediator as “an
impartial outsider who tries to aid the negotiators in their quest to find a compromise
agreement”).
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looking simply for a procedure that “will end their problems.”
This vision of mediation differs from two important, albeit related,
ideas. The first idea views mediation as an efficient tool for facilitating
agreement and gaining compliance among disputing persons about
future-looking plans. The second idea emphasizes that many people use
mediating skills and strategies to resolve conflicts, but do not pretend or
represent themselves to be a mediator. I want to consider each briefly.
Presume a tenured faculty member is serving as department chair of
the psychology department at a small liberal arts college. Two faculty
department members are viciously antagonistic toward one another.
Neither respects the other’s research skills or publications; each publicly
criticizes the other’s teaching skills to other departmental colleagues and
students. They refuse to serve together on the same department
committees. And they each want to teach a very popular course entitled
“The Psychology of Aging,” for which one section per year is offered.
Can that department chair effectively mediate the controversy over
their teaching assignment?
There are a number of adverse dynamics operating in this situation.
Suppose the department chair brings the disputing faculty members into
her office and says this: “I have had it with the two of you. Your
conduct demoralizes both faculty colleagues and students. Your
criticisms of one another’s scholarship, while possible in principle, is
done in a remarkably unprofessional manner. Here is how we will
handle the teaching assignment: we will rotate. Ms. Alice, you taught it
last year so I will assign it to Ms. Susan for this coming year. Ms. Alice,
you will get it the following year. I can’t see any other way to resolve
this, can you?”
Then Ms. Alice explodes: “That’s crazy. I wrote my Ph.D.
dissertation in this area only four years ago; I am the expert on this

2. For if that were all either sought, they could consider hiring an arsonist to engage in
conduct that would eliminate the other side. To the challenge that such conduct is illegal, of
course that is true. But if one had sufficient power, and was thoughtfully savvy and thought
that one could engage in that conduct without getting caught, then, at least in principle, one
or both of the parties could consider it. By contrast, those interested in resolving the conflict
“fairly” rule out certain approaches from the start. To be less dramatic, of course, all one
needs to consider is that one of the parties seeks legal redress for their challenge but in a
jurisdiction in which the judges are routinely “bought” by various parties, or where
government officials require payments in order to advance the procedure—that is, processes
in which justice is obviously undermined or distorted. We do not tolerate such distortions
when using mediation, either; using mediation to resolve disputes in a political community is a
justice event.
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subject. I should teach it both to advance my own research and to serve
the students well.” Ms. Susan responds, “You know that my long-time
career research has focused on the psychology of adolescent behavior.
But after twenty-five years in teaching, I clearly wanted to branch out
and look for new things. So I have been examining issues in this area for
the past two years. I love it. I bring the depth of my career’s
perspective to it. And it is where I plan to do my future scholarship.”
The two face each other; silence prevails. Finally, Ms. Alice states, “If
you won’t let us offer more than one section once per year, then I guess
alternating is the best option.” And Ms. Susan responds, “Guess that’s
right.” At which point the department chair says, “Terrific. We have an
agreement. Now get out.” The department chair, later that evening,
reports to her dean that she has finally—and successfully—mediated the
controversy regarding teaching assignments between Ms. Alice and Ms.
Susan.
The second scenario involves a parent trying to assist his two young
children to resolve their dispute regarding which video game to play on
their Nintendo Wii. The father says, “John, David. Stop shouting.
Let’s try to work this out. First, I want John to talk and make his
proposals; David, let him finish before you talk. Then, David, you will
speak and share your ideas and John will not interrupt. After that, we’ll
see how we go forward.” After three minutes of conversation, the
children reach an agreement on which game they will each play, the
sequence of who gets the machine first, and the length of time each can
play before turning it over to the other sibling. When the father’s
spouse comes home later that evening, he reports to her that “the
evening was a bit wild, but I successfully mediated the dispute between
the kids about the use of the Wii machine.”
Would we agree that the department chair and the parent engaged
in “mediating”? And, if so, would we describe either process as a justice
event? More important, if we did not, do we care?
While neither situation is an example of the mediation process, at
least in the core central meaning of that phrase, I do not believe that
there is any significant harm in describing the department chair’s
conduct as a limited version of mediating and saying that the parent
used mediating skills in forging agreements reached by his children.
Further, I do not believe that in either situation our dominant concern is
that the process used to resolve the dispute comports with notions of
justice. The department chair wants the controversy quieted—on
efficiency grounds, if nothing else. The chorus of okays regarding the
teaching schedule, whether imposed or embraced, really is not

10 - STULBERG-10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

MUST A MEDIATOR BE NEUTRAL?

6/8/2012 8:31 PM

833

important; the chair wants to put the matter behind them and move on;
she made it clear the direction the resolution would take, and, in
management jargon, obtained some (tepid) buy-in. While this process
of problem solving and decision-making might be incorporated and
embraced by various business organizations as one tool for handling
disputes collaboratively and efficiently, no mediator would celebrate
these approaches as being ones consistent with justice considerations.
The same is true for the parent intervention. There are other, more
pressing values to consider: a quiet evening; children behaving; and,
possibly, everyone getting to sleep at a reasonable hour. We could all
understand that this situation may simply not be the time to be
concerned about whether this is a fair process and outcome.
All of which is to say that justice is one virtue, but perhaps not the
3
most important one, for various aspects of our lives.
But neither of these intervener approaches is sufficient to address
the dynamics of the civic controversy sketched above. We do not want a
city mayor, in the style of the department chair, to admonish parties to
behave civilly, nor do we want law enforcement officers, à la the parent,
to monitor participant conduct. Rather, we want an intervener who is
respected by the participants to engage the stakeholders, shape a rich
dialogue among them and prod them to explore and take responsibility
for developing acceptable ways to create a stable, functioning
relationship. In short, we want a mediator to guide the conversation in a
manner that insures that values and principles other than the “get this
case off my desk” mentality take center stage.
III. WHAT IS THE COST OF THE INTERVENER NOT BEING NEUTRAL?
What does a party to a mediation conference want in her mediator?
While I recognize that there are a number of qualities and

3. In neither the department-chair nor the parent example, of course, are we indifferent
to the manner in which the matter is resolved. We want there to be a modicum of peace
within the department; we want children to be respected and to feel as though the matter was
resolved in a non-arbitrary way. But efficiency and other priorities carry more weight than
due process concerns. (Frankly, I overstate the matter in the parent example just for
purposes of emphasis; I actually believe that one of the most important lessons that parents
can teach and model for their children are those values of according respect and dignity to
one another in the conduct of challenging conversations—those disputing moments among
siblings become occasions for teaching others about fair dealing. But I recognize that not
every parenting moment can command that approach.)
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4

characteristics she seeks in the intervener, I would argue that being
neutral is central. If one were skeptical, of course, one might assert that
each disputant wants an intervener who will endorse her perspective and
proposals, and then persuade the other party to agree to embrace them.
But since each individual recognizes that everyone might want that, and
that no one will agree to such an intervener because it undercuts her
interests to do so, then, minimally, each party seeks someone who will
not instantly be against her interests or try to persuade her to relinquish
her proposals on some or all matters. That is, each will want the
mediator to be neutral—not someone who is simply impartial or
objective.
We can test this claim by considering the following standard legal
dispute: a landlord brings an eviction action against her tenant for
nonpayment of rent. The tenant has refused to pay rent for the past two
months. Her defense is that her landlord used white paint when
painting her apartment walls rather than the dark blue that the tenant
had requested and that, the tenant claims, had been agreed to by the
landlord when the parties signed the lease. In most U.S. jurisdictions,
the tenant’s asserted ground does not constitute a legal basis for
nonpayment; a judge would rule in the landlord’s favor.
But what if that case were referred to mediation. The standard
mediation approach would be to invite the parties to share their
perspectives; recount their understandings; explore possible options for
advancing respective, if not competing, interests; and assist them in
exploring possible settlement terms. Some possible outcomes might
include the landlord agreeing to let the tenant buy her desired paint
color and paint the apartment interior as she wished in exchange for the
landlord having the right to repaint the apartment interior to her desired
color—at the tenant’s expense—six months prior to the expiration of the
lease. And with that understanding and commitment, the landlord
might agree to waive her claim for current rent arrears.
All that might be possible. But, what would we say if the mediator

4. Famously, Riskin’s original grid is designed as a guide to the possibly perplexed
advocate who is seeking assistance in thinking through what skills and traits to look for in
selecting a mediator. The suggestions range from intellectual acuity and substantive
knowledge about the topic in dispute to possession of process skills. See Leonard L. Riskin,
Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed,
1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996); see also JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA P. LOVE, THE
MIDDLE VOICE: MEDIATING CONFLICT SUCCESSFULLY 28–30 (2009) (articulating sixteen
characteristics that a person would want a mediator to possess).
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did not explore those possibilities and instead said to the parties,
whether in joint session or caucus, “Look. Everyone knows the rules.
Tenant, there is no legal basis for your refusing to pay rent. Although
the landlord can waive her rights, you must be prepared to pay her the
money you owe her. Let’s see if we can work out a payment system that
works for you and is acceptable to the landlord.” Why would we be
concerned about the mediator acting this way?
First, some would argue that while a mediator can provide legal
information to the parties (if qualified by training and experience to do
5
so), it is not the mediator’s role to do so. Second, and more
significantly, we might criticize the mediator for insisting that the tenant
recognize that she “has no legal case” and that the tenant should “agree
to perform her legal duty.” Why is that problematic?
I believe the only basis for claiming that such a mediator move is
objectionable—and should be roundly criticized—is that it vividly
displays that the mediator is not neutral with respect to what the
outcome should be. Quite the contrary, she believes that the tenant
“should do what the law requires.”
But here is the irony. I believe that a mediator in that situation
6
could comfortably and accurately describe her conduct as impartial.
Why? Impartiality requires that the intervener apply the relevant rules
and guidelines in an identical manner to all persons similarly situated.
To the disgruntled tenant who complains that she believes that the
mediator is “beating up” on her, the mediator could readily retort that
“my comments are nothing against you personally—I would be saying
this to any tenant so situated.” And she—the mediator—would be
absolutely correct.
To critics who might be worried that the mediator is siding with the
elite against the have-nots, all we need to do is alter the fact pattern so
that the tenant refuses to pay rent because she is not receiving heat and
hot water in her apartment. Those grounds typically do constitute a
basis for reducing rental payments, and the mediator could press the
landlord to do what the law required by stating, “I am not doing this
because I favor the tenant over you. I would say the same to any
landlord if I were faced with these facts.”

5. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard VI.A.5 (2005).
6. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 161 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that “there is no
absurdity in conceding that an unjust law forbidding the access of coloured persons to the
parks has been justly administered”).
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So requiring a mediator to be impartial does not secure or advance a
vision of mediation that inspires confidence that it is an alternative
dispute resolution process to the courts. Why? Stated bluntly, the
“rule(s)” that the mediator impartially applies may themselves be
burdensome, unfair, discriminatory, or on some other basis, ill-founded.
Applying them impartially, while better than arbitrarily, prima facie
diminishes rather than advances substantive justice claims. The
mediator who is impartial may be, to borrow a phrase of a different
generation, one more person who is part of the problem rather than the
7
solution.
Is this concern for the difference between being neutral and being
impartial relevant only for controversies involving presumptively
modest financial claims? Not at all. Consider the following examples:
(1) The family mediator insists that the soon-to-be ex-husband
provide financial support at a level that meets the amounts set forth in
that jurisdiction’s minimum child support guidelines.
(2) The civil-court appointed mediator of a home construction
controversy—a roof gone bad—prevents the plaintiff from seeking
certain recovery for identifiable items because applicable evidentiary
rules would preclude the introduction of supporting testimony at trial.
(3) The mediator selected by the parties to resolve an alleged breach
of a non-compete clause in an employment contract insists that
whatever settlement terms the parties develop be consistent with the
legal requirement that the “geographic range” governing such a noncompete prohibition be reasonable.
In each situation, the mediator acted impartially but not neutrally.
In so doing, she undermines core values distinctive to the mediation
process. Why is mediator impartiality insufficient to insure a fair
outcome?
We want mediation to be a fair process that generates a fair
outcome. Deciding what is or is not fair, of course, is controversial.

7. The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA), for instance, defines a mediator as “an
individual who conducts a mediation,” but then insists that a mediator must disclose any
information that may affect her impartiality. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(3) & cmt. 3
(2003). While I believe that the UMA is an important, positive contribution to the field in
many aspects, I personally regret that it omits the term neutrality from its definition of the
mediator’s role. The same comment, regrettably, applies to the Model Standards of Conduct
for Mediators. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard II
(requiring that a mediator “conduct a mediation in an impartial manner” but not in a neutral
manner).
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One way to establish a fair outcome is to define its parameters or terms
on grounds independent of the procedure used to secure them. In
deciding a fair outcome for dividing a cake among two children, for
example, we decide that, absent a compelling reason, the presumptively
fair division is to provide each child with equally sized slices. The
process we might use to secure that goal—“X cuts and Y chooses
first”—is designed to promote that goal. In Rawlsian terms, this
approach to problem-solving would be described as an instance of
8
“perfect procedural justice,” for in every iteration the process would
produce the desired outcome. If mediation were viewed as a process of
perfect procedural justice—that is, one designed and used to help
disputing parties secure an outcome that itself is defined and endorsed
as desirable on grounds independent of mediation—then mediator
impartiality, not neutrality, is sufficient. In the examples above, if
persons believe that the fair, mediated settlement terms are precisely
those which the law mandates, then mediator impartiality is sufficient.
But that is not a compelling vision of mediation; that is the picture of a
settlement conference.
Of course, we could relax the demanding standard of perfect
procedural justice and posit mediation as an instance of “imperfect
9
procedural justice.” In this latter situation, the desired outcome is still
defined and embraced independently of the process—e.g., outcomes
mandated by or consistent with the law—but we acknowledge that the
mediation process might have other institutional values, such as party
autonomy, that permit parties in some instances to reach outcomes that
10
fail that standard. Rawls explicates this notion by citing our criminal

8. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971) (describing characteristic
features of “perfect procedural justice”).
9. See id. at 85–86 (illustrating the concept of “imperfect procedural justice”).
10. Consider the following case: A nightclub patron sees a famous athlete in the club.
The patron approaches the athlete and makes obnoxious, racially derogatory remarks to him.
The athlete assaults the patron. The patron, an immigrant who is in the United States
illegally, brings a civil action against the athlete for damages. In mediated settlement
discussion, the patron’s lawyer indicates that if the defendant proposes to pay the plaintiff
$50,000 in exchange for the patron’s promise not to pursue criminal charges, the proposal
would itself be illegal as an instance of extortion. The defendant, if convicted of a felony
rather than a misdemeanor, would face certain jail time—and the resulting impairment of his
employment status. One possible resolution would be for the defendant to pay an agreedupon sum and for the plaintiff to agree to leave the country. Without the victim, the
prosecutor might file misdemeanor charges along the lines of disturbing the peace and require
community service as a penalty. The parties have reached an acceptable resolution, though
arguably “all the requirements of law” have not been advanced. I find this mediated outcome
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trial process: if our goal is to convict the guilty and let the innocent go
free, then we want to design and implement a criminal procedure
11
process to secure this. But our criminal court procedures also have
other values and goals—e.g., rules protecting the confidentiality of
spousal statements—and the application of those rules might, in limited
but predictable circumstances, undercut the promotion of the desired
goal.
I believe that this approach to mediation—where we insist only that
a mediator be impartial when operating with rules that, independently
of party agreement, identify the desired outcome—becomes even more
toxic when used in settings where those “independent standards” are
less visible or more narrowly embraced than something as public as “the
law.” The juvenile court mediator who insists that the fourteen-year-old
agree to do homework “two hours per evening without interruption by
text messages from friends” might be encouraging the teenager to
engage in behavior that is, objectively, beneficial for her. But the
mediator, in dispensing her own brand of parental, maternalistic justice,
is certainly “dissing” that teenager’s dignity. In my judgment, that
disrespect has no place in mediation.
Finally, let us consider a mediator’s impartiality, not neutrality, in
disputes involving matters that affect the environment, such as the
location of a waste facility, the construction of a high-voltage
transmission line, or the siting of windmills. The impartial mediator
would facilitate conversations to make certain that various EPA rules
and guidelines were considered and adopted because they were the
governing law. This would insure consistency and predictability of
negotiated outcomes but perhaps at the cost of party creativity,
efficiency, and acceptability.
I must make one important disclaimer. When I insist that mediator
impartiality is not sufficient to insure a just process or outcome, I do not
mean to say that parties, in their spirited discussions or arguments about
the controversy and in the development and advocacy of their proposals
for resolving it, would not or should not make reference to those
standards or claims. Of course they would. In fact, those elements
might be decisive to a party’s decision to accept the proposed outcome.

perfectly acceptable and creative. But it suggests that there are other goals or values of the
process that, on occasion, undermine the promotion of “generating outcomes mandated by
law,” so in that way, mediation would be an example of imperfect procedural justice.
11. See generally id. at 85–86.
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And the mediator would be acting appropriately, I believe (consistent
with a posture of neutrality), if she were to invite some or all of the
parties to consider those matters—e.g., “Why do you believe, Mr.
Stulberg, that the minimum support guidelines should not govern what
you propose to pay your soon-to-be ex-spouse?” These standards are
certainly relevant to the parties’ discussion. But mediation, I believe,
does not require that they be decisive.
If mediator impartiality is not sufficient to insure a just outcome,
how about mediator objectivity? Objectivity is clearly an important
intellectual trait for a mediator: it is crucial for a mediator to be able to
examine and analyze evidence without being influenced by irrelevant
factors.
A mediator, for instance, who routinely evaluated the
credibility of party accounts and proposals through the process of
12
reactive devaluation would be not only ineffective, but also, and more
importantly, she would be undermining mediation goals of improving
party understanding or promoting constructive problem solving conduct.
But mediator objectivity cannot be a sufficient condition for
promoting conflict resolution. Why? A mediator could objectively
analyze conditions relevant to influencing or persuading one party to
agree to a certain course of action, and then act so as to secure such
party compliance. Requiring a mediator to be objective imposes even
fewer constraints on her conduct than does the duty of impartiality.
I conclude that neither impartiality nor objectivity require enough
mediator discipline to give us confidence in the justice of the process
and outcome.
Where do we turn?
IV. MEDIATOR APPROACHES
Let us return to a consideration of what a party values in their
mediator. There are two distinctions offered regarding mediator traits
that I believe are profoundly wrong and generate undesirable social
consequences. The first is that between a “process expert” and a
“substantive expert”—in other words, the belief that a mediator can be
13
the first without being the second. The second distinction, described in

12. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 795, 804–05 (2004).
13. See James R. Antes et al., Is a Stage Model of Mediation Necessary?, 16 MEDIATION
Q. 287, 288–91 (1999) (describing the mediator as “tour guide, helping the parties get where
they want to go”). But see id. at 289–90 (acknowledging that a mediator’s process decisions
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different ways, is that between a “passive” and an “active” mediator. I
believe these accounts are not accurate and undermine our
understanding and endorsement of mediation as a justice process.
A. Process–Substance Dichotomy
Mediation as we routinely use it today is clearly a dispute resolution
process. And there are clearly practices and guidelines that shape its
procedural dimensions: the questions of who can or cannot participate,
what topics can or must be addressed, and what information is public or
private are illustrative.
A mediator must be a “process expert”: she must not only know how
to implement the operative guidelines of mediating within a particular
setting, but also, and more broadly, be conversant about and
experienced in what constitutes “good process.” Bringing this expertise
to a conversation is a significant contribution and no mediator should
become defensive if charged by others as being “all about process.”
But the distinction between process and substantive expertise
addresses two different matters, one relating to mediator qualifications
and the other to the mediator’s role. The process–substance distinction,
initially, highlights the possibility that a person might be thoroughly
knowledgeable about the subject matter in dispute—knowing how
movie scripts are developed and written can help a mediator appreciate
a controversy between competing authors over movie credits for the
screenplay—but inexperienced or unskilled at conducting an
informative, constructive conversation. Because knowing how to
include participants, facilitate information exchanges, probe for
priorities, and generate ideas are, in important ways, “process skills,”

can affect the substance of a dispute).
14. Susskind suggests this distinction when concluding that environmental mediators,
when fulfilling the responsibilities he sets forth,
were willing to inject themselves into the substance of the disputes. They were not
content merely to facilitate and encourage discussion among the parties. In that
regard, they were activitists. . . . They worked behind the scenes, between meetings
and during meetings, to find elements of agreement that could be treated
separately, items that could be taded, issues that could be packaged, and ways in
which the momentum of the negotiations could be used to pressure holdouts.
Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV.
1, 39–40 (1981). Riskin’s account of the facilitative and evaluative mediator can be viewed as
a different attempt to account for the same phenomenon. See Riskin, supra note 4, at 24–35
& fig.3.
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not having them presumptively disqualifies someone from mediating.
The second matter that the distinction crystallizes relates to the role
of the mediator. If one presumes that the mediation process should be
structured to facilitate proposals acceptable to the parties, the potential
downside of having a mediator who is a “substantive” expert is that she
will cajole, direct, or coerce the parties into accepting those resolutions
that the mediator believes (perhaps accurately, given her expertise) are
the right, best, or fair thing to do; that, of course, potentially undermines
party autonomy.
While I believe that the process–knowledge distinction is
conceptually plausible, I find it importantly misleading and, hence,
dangerous. To appreciate the danger, let us reconsider the perspective
of a party to mediation. What contribution does the mediator make to
the conversation if she does not have knowledge about any (or indeed,
several) of the matters in or dynamics of dispute? In my judgment, the
contribution might not only be minimal—it might be affirmatively
harmful. How is that possible?
First, I believe such process intervention would be only minimally
effective. If the mediator does not possess some knowledge about a
particular area relevant to the controversy, then she is not able to ask
15
questions that might be helpful or to probe the plausibility or
16
desirability of particular party claims. Participating in such a process
could be a considerable waste of a party’s time and resources. There are
ways, of course, for the mediator to plug this knowledge gap—one ready
strategy is to create a mediator team in which at least one member
possesses relevant substantive knowledge about significant aspects of
the dispute. But to make this move embraces the notion that knowledge
as well as process is required.

15. Thereby failing to discharge the mediator’s goal of improving participant
understanding of the challenge. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS
pmbl. (2003) (describing mediation as a process that “serves various purposes, including
providing the opportunity for parties to define and clarify issues” and “understand different
perspectives”).
16. Thereby failing to discharge the mediator’s task of being an agent of reality. I realize
that these tasks are not described as central elements of the mediator’s job in the
transformative model of mediation, in the sense that it is the mediator’s task to advance these
inquiries when not prompted or endorsed by party request. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH
& JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT
THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 116–18 (1994). But if one presumes that all
parties have invited such intervention, then having—or not having—relevant substantive
knowledge about aspects of the controversy becomes applicable.
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Second, acting on the proposed distinction—and securing a mediator
with only process skills—jeopardizes justice outcomes. I believe the
process–knowledge distinction cuts two ways: the danger of a mediator
possessing substantive knowledge is that she might try to impose her
beliefs about a desirable outcome on unwilling parties; but equally, the
danger of having only a process expert is that parties might generate
outcomes that are notably uninformed or unfair.
How do we sort this out? The answer is not to jettison the concept
of mediator neutrality. Rather, we should embrace the idea that an
effective mediator is one who must possess both process and substantive
17
knowledge and then explore how that combination can be consistently
marshaled to discharge the mediator’s job.
B. Passive–Active Mediator
What would it mean for someone to be a passive mediator? I find it
easier to understand that concept by analyzing its contrast, the activist
mediator.
The “activist mediator,” a term often used to describe Susskind’s
18
account of the environmental mediator, characterizes mediator
conduct that often includes: (1) “pressing a party” to justify the
persuasiveness of its particular claim or the plausibility of its proposal;
(2) persistently or aggressively prodding the parties to engage in
brainstorming to generate possible settlement terms; (3) suggesting
ideas to some or all parties for possible resolution; and (4) controlling
the discussion process—deciding, for example, whether a proposal

17. To claim that a mediator should possess both process and substantive knowledge
does not mean, of course, that the “substantive knowledge” that a mediator possesses
matches the full range of knowledge needs that might arise in a particular dispute. For
instance, if someone were to mediate an environmental dispute involving the closing of a
nuclear plant, she might possess broad-based knowledge about the political process and
dynamics for regulating such environmental matters, but she might possess very little
knowledge about the science of nuclear waste disposal. Again, the plausible “fix” for this is
to join a person to the mediation team—or to gain the party’s endorsement of providing a
neutral expert for themselves or the mediator—in order to facilitate joint understanding,
discussion, and problem solving. See generally Lela P. Love & Joseph B. Stulberg, Practice
Guidelines for Co-Mediation: Making Certain that “Two Heads Are Better Than One,” 13
MEDIATION Q. 179 (1996).
18. Susskind’s actual term is “mediator with clout.” Susskind, supra note 14, at 35; see
also id. at 42 (asserting that “[e]ffective environmental mediation may require . . . some
[mediators] with political clout”). I later termed this example a “special case of the activist
mediator.” Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor
Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 109 (1981).
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developed in an individual caucus should be transmitted in a
reconvened joint session or in a separate caucus.
Many writers have identified such mediator behavior and endorsed
19
its use. For the most part, Riskin’s evaluative mediator is an activist,
20
Alfini’s “trashers,” “hashers,” and “bashers” are activists, and Stulberg
21
and Love’s BADGER mediator fits this description as well. If the
above account of the activist mediator is accurate, then the most vivid
“non-activist” mediator is, presumptively, someone who exhibits some
22
version of Riskin’s “facilitative” mediator and, most prominently,
23
includes a transformative mediator.
But this “sorting” process is
mischievous, for it masks the danger of the “passivist–activist”
distinction as it relates to justice considerations.
The “facilitative” mediator is often characterized as the mediator
24
who only asks questions.
She only “helps,” and never “urges” or
25
“pushes.” That mediator approach, understandably, can be labeled
“passive.” It is easy to understand that the mediator who embraces the
process–substantive distinction and who then asserts that she is a
“process-only” expert and mediates with a facilitative approach could
quickly, and accurately, be labeled a “passive” mediator. That mediator
would resist any party request to provide information—“my role is to
help all of you talk this through in a cordial manner, not to provide
information or make suggestions”—and would refuse to probe or
challenge the plausibility or acceptability of particular proposals—“my
job is not to tell any of you what to do, it is to create a comfortable
conversational climate in which you can discuss any matter that you
wish.”

19. Riskin, supra note 4, at 28.
20. James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of “Good
Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66–73 (1991).
21. STULBERG & LOVE, supra note 4, at 45–46.
22. Riskin, supra note 4, at 28–29, 32–34.
23. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 116. I think it is important, however, to qualify
this account of transformative mediation. I believe a transformative mediator is “activist” in
multiple, significant ways, many of which I believe are congruent with other approaches to
mediation. But if I understand the transformative approach accurately, then clearly the
transformative mediator is not an activist in the ways described above, unless it is preceded by
the mediator asking parties a question such as: “Do you think it would be helpful to each of
you if I shared with you some approaches to resolving such matters that I have seen work for
persons in other settings?” But perhaps even that question is too direct.
24. See, e.g., Riskin, supra note 4, at 28.
25. See id. at 35 fig.3.
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Many of us have observed such passive mediators. In my judgment,
there is nothing to recommend that approach. It often generates party
frustration and exasperation. But that harsh critique must not be
misunderstood.
I certainly believe that a mediator can—and, frankly, must—be
“facilitative.” It is the only approach to mediating consistent with
promoting party dignity, respect, and autonomous decision-making. I
support the notion that evaluative mediation, as it is reportedly
practiced, is inconsistent with a robust conception of the mediation
26
process.
But the danger of these two dichotomies is this: A mediator, when
doing her job, must be (1) knowledgeable about both process and at
27
least some aspects of the substance; (2) facilitative; and (3) activist.
How is it possible to blend these necessary elements and still be neutral
with regard to outcomes? We must revisit the process–substance
distinction.
V. PROCESS–SUBSTANCE AND THEORIES OF JUSTICE
As both Lawrence Susskind and Bernard Mayer properly note, a
mediator must care deeply about process matters. Those elements
include answering such questions as: Who should participate? Who can
be present and who must participate? Where and when will the
meetings occur? What guidelines govern the process of developing or
sharing information? What happens if one party displays a significant
inability to participate adequately in the process?
Why are these matters important? They are important because we
care that the mediation process comports with considerations of justice.
At least in the United States, we seem able to generate consensus
regarding the basic elements that constitute a due process
26. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron,
14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31, 31–32 (1996). I find unpersuasive—and, often,
self-serving—defenses for the evaluative mediator approach, particularly when that defense is
lodged in the claim that it is the approach that the parties want. For thoughtful attempts to
defend evaluative mediation, see Marjorie Corman Aaron, Evaluation in Mediation, in
MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS
267, 268 (Dwight Golann ed., 1996); John Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator Responds, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 70 (1996); and James H. Stark, The Ethics of
Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, from an
Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 770, 775–79, 798 (1997).
27. See Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing
the “Grid” Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 996–97 (1997).
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28

conversation. But what conception of justice is advanced by “good
process”? Here it is helpful to return to Rawls’ distinction noted
29
above.
Rawls describes three types of procedural justice programs: (1)
perfect procedural justice; (2) imperfect procedural justice; and (3) pure
30
procedural justice.
What distinguishes perfect and imperfect procedural justice from
pure procedural justice is that the standards for determining a fair or
31
desired outcome in the first two are independent of the process itself.
By contrast, in pure procedural justice, the standard for determining a
32
fair or desired outcome is embedded within the process itself. How are
these distinctions relevant to real problems?
For many social activities, we can successfully create a process that
systematically advances or secures our independently established and
justified goal. A grievance procedure negotiated between union and
management representatives that stipulates binding arbitration as its last
step is a party-designed process that perfectly promotes the consistent
interpretation and application of the substantive terms of the parties’
collective bargaining agreement.
A process of imperfect procedural justice also promotes an
independently justified goal. But it has the following feature: it
explicitly recognizes that the process may have values that conflict with
always securing the stated goal, but for independent reasons, they
should be recognized and operate to trump that goal. For example,
college sports fans endorse the goal of being able to identify one college
football team each year that is the best in the land—hence, deserving of
a number-one ranking. But the process used to secure that outcome—

28. When developing the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Standard VI.A,
Professor Michael Moffitt forcefully contended at the April 2004 public meeting that was
discussing the Model Standards that the Joint Committee should use the phrase “procedural
fairness” rather than “fairness” when delineating the ethical duties of a mediator when
conducting a quality mediation process. Many in that audience strongly endorsed his
comment. The adopted version (September 2005) contains that language. See MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard VI.A (2005). For a more complete
description of Moffitt’s opinions, see Michael L. Moffitt, The Wrong Model, Again: Why the
Devil Is Not in the Details of the New Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, DISP. RES.
MAG., Spring 2006, at 32.
29. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 85–86.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 86.
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the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) process—accommodates such
other values as league identity and bowl traditions that can operate to
trump creating a championship game among the country’s two best
teams.
If a mediation advocate were to promote mediation’s use because it
generated outcomes that were close to those reached in non-mediated
settings (presumptively, court settings) and because mediations were
conducted more efficiently, with less financial and emotional cost to the
parties, and generated outcomes that gained high compliance, then that
advocate views mediation as an instance of perfect procedural justice.
Why? Because the cited goals—to generate outcomes close to those
reached in a court process efficiently and with less burden on the
parties—are criteria for establishing the “justice” of the process and are
developed and justified independent of the process itself. Mayer
33
appears to endorse this approach. A mediation proponent could also
endorse mediation as an instance of imperfect procedural justice by
insisting that such values as party autonomy, improving party
relationships, or displaying respect for one’s bargaining counterpart
might sometimes operate to result in mediated settlement terms that
were less generous than court-imposed outcomes.
By contrast, Susskind importantly and emphatically states, “good
34
process almost always yields a good outcome.” That approach appears
to embrace Rawls’ sense of mediation being an instance of pure
35
procedural justice. Susskind urges that a mediator must pay attention
to the following process details before she endorses or signs off on the
process: Are the appropriate parties included in the conversation? Does
each party have the capacity or skill to capably articulate their interests
and examine their options? Are procedures or understandings in place
for handling the possibility that the proposed negotiated outcome will
harm a non-participant? What will happen if the proposed outcomes
overlook the possibility of alternative arrangements that could notably

33. Panel Discussion, Core Values of Dispute Resolution: Is Neutrality Necessary?, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 805, 819 (indicating that outcomes in mediation—at least in the divorce
area—do not differ notably from those secured through non-mediated outcomes). However,
Mayer’s subsequent comments regarding the central need for “constructive engagement”
could be read to support an alternative interpretation. Id. at 819. I explore that below. See
infra pp. 851–54.
34. Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 819–20.
35. See RAWLS, supra note 8, at 88 (describing how, under pure procedural justice,
“allotment of [benefits] takes place in accordance with the public system of rules”).
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36

enhance each party’s interests and goals? For Susskind, if all these
matters are successfully addressed, then it appears that we have created
a process whose fair outcomes are contained in the process itself. That,
37
in fact, is the approach I enthusiastically endorse.
But Susskind
appears to shy away from that conclusion, so we continue to differ in
two ways.
First, when Susskind raised these considerations in his early
38
celebrated piece, the inference many drew—particularly when he
39
discussed and endorsed the notion of the mediator with clout —was
that Susskind concluded it was the mediator’s duty to protect the
40
unrepresented interests and insure Pareto-optimal outcomes. If the
negotiating parties did not agree to the presence of a representative in
the negotiations to protect the interests of an “unborn generation” nor
were committed to adopting Pareto-maximum outcomes, then it was the
mediator’s ethical duty—he was accountable for—to protect those
unrepresented interests or secure Pareto-optimality.
But in my
judgment, those considerations—protecting future generations or
Pareto optimality—are more accurately described as independent
standards that define a “fair” or “just” outcome. If those goals must be
secured by the conduct of parties in the mediated discussions, then
mediation in its strongest formulation would be an example of perfect,
not pure, procedural justice.
Second, Susskind’s more recent account, beginning with his
41
statement that “good process almost always yields a good outcome,”
appears to differ from his earlier approach. Susskind thoughtfully
advances the following claim: “[W]e need to be prepared to say what we
42
think a good outcome is.” And, to him, a “good outcome” has the
following features: (1) it is viewed as fair by the parties; (2) the process
was efficient; (3) the outcome or outcomes are stable; and (4) the
36. See Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 809, 816–17. This list is not meant to be
exhaustive. While Susskind at first instance shies away from insisting that all these matters be
actually adopted and in place before proceeding (“I only ask questions about these matters”),
for reasons discussed below, I do not think that goes far enough.
37. I believe Mayer does as well. See his discussion of “constructive engagement.” Id.
at 819.
38. See Susskind, supra note 14.
39. Id. at 30–37.
40. Id. at 17. To achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome, a “neutral observer must be
convinced that joint net gains have been maximized.” Id.
41. Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 816.
42. Id. at 816–17.
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43

outcome or outcomes are wise.
I believe the first three elements are correct. But the fourth
feature—the outcome must be “wise”—brings through the back door an
external standard for assessing what is “fair” or “right”—and thereby
transforms the mediation framework from that of pure procedural
justice to one of either perfect or imperfect procedural justice. More
importantly, if it is the mediator’s duty (or that for which he can be held
accountable) to ensure a ‘wise’ outcome, then a mediator must jettison
her commitment to the neutrality of outcomes, for her job is to secure
wisdom. For reasons I argued previously, I do not find this vision of an
impartial, but non-neutral, mediator consistent with the distinctively
democratic values of the mediation process. Where does that leave us?
VI. A JUSTICE FRAMEWORK FOR MEDIATION
Each of us in this field is—properly—concerned about endorsing,
promoting, and supporting a dispute resolution process whose outcomes
flaunt basic standards of fair treatment, considerations of equality and
44
respect, and the exercise of individual freedom.
We can readily envision hypotheticals that trigger our sense of
injustice: the soon-to-be ex-spouse who agrees to financial settlement
terms less generous than what the law mandates or the tenant who
accepts the landlord’s reimbursement of the contested security deposit
ignorant that she was legally entitled to treble damages. Why should we
promote “acceptability” or “party autonomy” in mediation if its
45
outcomes significantly deviate from these community norms?
I want to celebrate acceptability for two fundamental reasons: First,
43. Id.
44. One can criticize this claim as being myopically “Western”—and individualistic at
that—in one’s orientation to human values. That charge, while clearly important, requires an
extended response, which I think perfectly possible. All I need or want to highlight by
making this comment is that at least for mediation advocates practicing in the United States,
if we observed that mediation was being used to help parties forge agreements that
systematically denied all citizens access to various employment opportunities, resulting in
“mutually acceptable plans” that sustained public school systems that were both racially
segregated and allocated significantly disproportionate public economic resources to those of
only one race, then we would all be concerned that the “mediation process” was producing
outcomes that were not simply “illegal” under current law but also “unfair” or “unjust.” And
those claims, which I believe are warranted, would be based on our considered appeals to
political liberty and equal treatment.
45. See ELLEN WALDMAN, MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 26
(2011) (stating that “legal norms can be useful in delineating the minimal set of obligations
owed the less powerful by the more powerful”).
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the values of mediation support and require persons to treat one
46
another with dignity and respect.
Second, I believe that a welldesigned mediation process generates “just” results more consistently
and compellingly than do other dispute-resolution procedures. While
that may appear to be an audacious claim, I believe it is persuasive. But
central to its persuasiveness is that a mediator must be neutral with
respect to outcome—without it, the process indeed can be dangerous.
I have argued elsewhere that six features must be part of a
mediation process in order for us (à la Susskind and Mayer) to assert
47
that it is a “good” process. More strongly, I claim that if these six
features are present, then the mediation should be considered an
example of pure procedural justice and that any outcomes generated by
48
its participants will be just. In short, “party acceptability” is laudable
49
as a matter of justice.
I set out below a brief description of those standards and a short
account of their significance.
(1) Voluntariness.
Each mediation participant must have the
capacity to engage in autonomous decision-making, displaying an ability
to choose among two or more possible actions. Persons who lack
mental capacity to make rational decisions cannot genuinely participate
in a dispute resolution process that predicates decision-making on party
50
autonomy.
(2) Inalienability of interests. The mediation process must be such
that no person can irrevocably relinquish her ability to enjoy one of her
fundamental freedoms throughout the course of a normal life. A person
who agrees to be another’s servant for life in exchange for sustained
food and shelter should, in a dispute resolution process, be able to

46. This claim is similar to what transformative mediators posit as one of their two main
goals: “recognition.” See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH AND JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION 77 (2004) (explaining that the hallmark of a recognition shift is
“letting go—however briefly or partially—of one’s focus on self and becoming interested in
the perspective of the other party as such, concerned about the situation of the other as a
fellow human being, not as an instrument for fulfilling one’s own needs”) But my argument
for supporting the notion that the mediation process requires parties to accord dignity and
respect to one another is conceptually different. See Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and
Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213, 234–38 (2005).
47. Stulberg, supra note 46, at 227–28.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 227–29.
50. Id. at 228–30.
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51

escape that contractual duty of enslavement.
(3) Publicity of outcomes. In principle, outcomes must be capable of
being made public so that the mediation process does not become a
52
vehicle to sustain free-riders. Settlement terms (deals such as paying
people off the books) that are predicated on everyone else complying
with rules but not the mediation parties—i.e., freeloaders—should not
53
be possible as a matter of normal practice.
(4) Dignity and respect. In principle, the process must be structured
so that persons affected by the outcome can participate in it and
everyone can discuss matters that are important to them. This insures
that the conversation is conducted in a manner that promotes party
dignity and respect. Stated differently, if the rules of the mediation
process arbitrarily restrict who can participate or what can be discussed,
then there is a significant risk that the discussion is skewed so that
matters of fundamental importance and dignity to one party are not
54
addressed.
(5) Informed decision-making. While no dispute resolution process
can require fully informed decision-making, the process must provide
some avenue for persons to have adequate information on which to
55
make their decisions.
(6) Toleration of conflicting fundamental values. The mediation
process has no purpose if it cannot serve as a forum for disputants who
hold profoundly different values to meet and explore resolving and
56
negotiating issues between them.
The stereotype often ascribed to “do-gooder” mediators is that
mediators require everyone to be nice and to like one another.

51. Id. at 230–33.
52. This claim is consistent with the conventional wisdom—and law in many areas—that
mediated conversations and outcomes are confidential. The goal of this standard is to
prevent parties from reaching agreements that the parties know to be unlawful and that will
be effective only because they will keep matters secret. I do not believe that we would want
to endorse a public system for using mediation to resolve disputes if we thought that this
could occur on a widespread basis. Of course, private organizations, in considering the use of
mediation to resolve intra-organizational matters, might have a different viewpoint on this
matter.
53. Id. at 233–34.
54. Id. at 234–38. This feature does not solve the practical challenge that the power
differential between the parties might lead one party to refuse to discuss what the other party
wants to examine. That is an important challenge—but not a justice one.
55. Id. at 238–40.
56. Id. at 240–41.
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Nonsense. If the mediation process is structured so that parties with
longstanding antagonisms—perhaps grounded in religious, racial,
economic, or cultural differences—cannot meet to discuss targeted
challenges unless one or more of the parties change their perspective,
then that process fails on justice considerations. That is not to approve
or condone all values. Rather, it helps highlight what mediated
discussions can address. At least some of the major participants in the
57
Occupy Wall Street demonstration presumptively do not share some of
the values of New York City’s elected political leadership. That does
not mean one or the other party must change their viewpoint before
engaging in mediated dialogue. Or to cite another instance, the
residents of the Poweltown neighborhood in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
did not have to accept the philosophical claims of the members of
MOVE—nor MOVE members accept the beliefs of the residents who
were viewed as part of “the system”—in order for all of them to
participate meaningfully in a mediation process designed to address
58
neighborhood health and safety issues.
I believe that if a mediation process is structured to incorporate each
of these dimensions, then the process is fair and the outcomes that the
parties develop and embrace will themselves be fair. But that will be
true only if the mediator is, in principle and in conduct, neutral with
regard to outcome.
VII. PROGRAM DESIGN AND MEDIATOR NEUTRALITY
Susskind and Mayer thoughtfully focus on what Mayer describes as
59
matters that are “all about design.”
In fact, Mayer claims that
60
mediators can, “help design [in advance a] structure of the interaction.”
Susskind simply posits that a person retained by some parties to assist
them with a controversy could comfortably label herself a mediator—
but then she should proceed with her engagement in a way that
discharges her duties noted above. I do not believe that any substantive

57. Occupy Wall Street (OWS) is a protest movement that began September 17, 2011, in
Zuccotti Park, located in New York City’s Wall Street financial district. The protest
movement decries corporate influence in government and wealth inequality. See About,
OCCUPYWALLSTREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
58. For a breathtaking account of this significant social challenge, see HIZKIAS ASSEFA
& PAUL WAHRHAFTIG, EXTREMIST GROUPS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE MOVE
CRISIS IN PHILADELPHIA (1988).
59. Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 814–15.
60. Id. at 815.
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difference rides on this terminological point. What is crucial, however,
and I believe applicable to both accounts, is raised by the question, what
should the dispute designer or mediator do if the parties insist on
proceeding in a way that the designer or mediator believes undesirable?
That is, what should the intervener do if, in her mind, she does not
believe there is a good process?
Examples abound. Susskind has observed that the framework for
61
resolving labor relations matters differ importantly across cultures. In
Paris, France, when transportation workers declare a strike of the Metro
system, the intervener might quickly ask leaders of the workers’ groups
and government agencies whether representatives from the local
chamber of commerce or the “Metro riders” organization should also be
62
included in the talks.
Much like an environmental dispute, the
rationale for expanded participation is obvious and compelling:
businesspersons and Metro-riders (or their representatives) are
stakeholders affected by the outcome of the negotiations. As a
pragmatic matter, their participation might possibly be constructive to
clarifying and resolving the issues, or at least make the implementation
of negotiated outcomes less contentious. As a matter of democratic
principle, they are entitled to have a voice.
Contrast that approach with the private-sector labor relations’
63
framework operating in the United States. The National Basketball
Association (NBA) and the NBA Players Association engaged in a
lockout that eliminated its traditional pre-season schedule and almost
64
two months of its regular season. Local businesses tied to the NBA
65
Local governments lost tax
suffered significant economic losses.
61. Lawrence Susskind, What Gets Lost in Translation, NEGOTIATION: DECISIONMAKING AND COMM. STRATEGIES THAT DELIVER RESULTS (Harv. Univ., Cambridge,
MA), Sept. 1, 2004, at 1, 4–5 (recommending that a mediator, when conducting cross-culture
mediations, should research the counterpart’s background and experience, enlist cultural
advisors, and pay particularly close attention to unfolding negotiation dynamics).
62. For an article discussing a recent strike in Paris, see Nicola Clark, France: Workers
Vote to Extend Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A21.
63. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
64. The NBA lockout began at midnight on July 1, 2011. Howard Beck, Stalemate in
Labor Talks Forces N.B.A. to Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2011, at B9. On November 26,
2011, owners and players reached a tentative agreement to end the lockout, which included
starting the season on December 25, 2011. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Reaches Tentative Deal to
Save Season, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at A1. The agreement was ratified on December 8,
2011. Ken Belson, N.B.A. Owners and Players Make Labor Agreement Official, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2011, at B18.
65. See, e.g., Ken Belson, In Portland, Where Blazers Reign, Lockout Leaves Void, N.Y.
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66

revenue. Fans were disappointed. Potential draftees to the league
67
were in limbo about career opportunities.
If a mediator from the
Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service (FMCS) (or a private
mediator hired by the parties) suggested to the representatives of the
club owners and ballplayers that their collective bargaining sessions
expand to include representatives from these stakeholders, I believe
their response would have been straightforward and vociferous: “No!”
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and its amendments,
68
bargaining is restricted to statutorily designated representatives —in
this instance, the employer and the representative of the selected
employee group. That is whom the FMCS mediator, by statute, works
with. Would Mayer—or any other conscientious mediator—agree or
continue to serve if he thought that such a process did not provide for
69
“constructive engagement”?
This is a crucial ethical question for a mediator that I believe arises
rather routinely in practice. It is the type of question that Mayer
70
correctly raises in his discussion of process design. Should there be a
court-annexed mediation program for resolving matters relating to a
marital dissolution when, under the court’s program, the mediator is
allowed only forty-five minutes for the mediation? If that is what the
court wants to adopt, should Mayer’s planner jettison the process?
Should individual mediators refuse to participate in it?
How should we respond to this type of process-design challenge? I
believe that different persons might, within a reasonable range, make
different judgments about whether she should proceed. We readily
understand—and have accepted—how a mediator routinely embraces
the labor-relations framework operative in the United States (whether
in the private or public sector), thereby excluding all non-statutorily

TIMES, Nov. 6, 2011, at SP5 [hereinafter Belson, Portland]; Tom Spousta, Oklahoma Wallets
and Pride Were Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at SP4 (reporting that “[t]he Oklahoma City
chamber of commerce estimated that each of the eight Thunder home dates lost with a
shortened 66-game season would cost $1.3 million”).
66. See, e.g., Belson, Portland, supra note 65.
67. See, e.g., NBA Players File Antitrust Lawuits Against League, Games Canceled
Through Dec. 15, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-1115/news/chi-nba-union-antitrust-complaint-to-be-filed-tuesday-night-20111115_1_nba-lockout
-nba-players-antitrust-lawsuits (reporting that Derrick Williams, the second overall draft pick
of the 2011 NBA draft, had yet to sign a contract because of the lockout).
68. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
69. Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 820.
70. Id. at 814–15.
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designated stakeholders from participating in collective bargaining
sessions. And we can surely appreciate how other individuals might
forcefully criticize that design feature by claiming that it disenfranchises
important stakeholders, and, on that basis—on a justice basis—refuse to
71
serve.
But what is crucial to note is that if an individual mediator decides to
participate, she must still remain neutral with respect to outcome. That
is, the design process “flaw” is a flaw of injustice—but even in the
flawed system, a neutral mediator can promote mediation’s values of
autonomy and respect, at least with regard to those persons
participating in it. However, if she discards her neutrality commitment,
then she exacerbates the injustice.
How is that so?
VIII. MEDIATOR NEUTRALITY: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS?
A mediator must be neutral with respect to negotiated outcomes but
72
not neutral with respect to process. That insight, properly understood,
73
remains valid. We can see why this is the case if we analyze Mayer’s
distinction between designing a process and conducting a mediation
74
within the designed process.
A. “Mediating” (or Consulting) About Process
The negotiating parties invite you to help them resolve their

71. “No taxation without representation” is certainly a historical rallying cry for persons
in the United States. See generally Grant Dorfman, Essay, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No
Taxation Without Representation” Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377
(2008) (providing a historical discussion on the importance of the phrase).
72. See Stulberg, supra note 18, at 96 (asserting that a major characteristic of a mediator
is that they “must be neutral with regard to outcome”).
73. The challenge arises when the parties agree to create a process that the mediator
finds undesirable. Some argue that the mediator must be flexible and honor party selfdetermination; others cite, for instance, the Model Standards of Conduct, particularly
Standard VI. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard VI (2005)
(requiring that a mediator only conduct a mediation “in a manner that promotes . . .
procedural fairness”).
74. See Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 813. Mayer noted that “there is room for a
lot of variation in how people view their role and responsibility”; consequently, when
establishing the process, the mediator will rarely be neutral. Id. at 812–13. In contrast, while
conducting mediation, the mediator must conduct the meeting from a “neutral stance—in
other words, [the mediator] can insure that participants are provided an effective voice and
that important issues are not avoided without intentionally trying to benefit one side at the
expense of the other.” Id. at 813.
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controversy. Presume the conflict involves wolves roaming onto
agricultural land, destroying crops. Property owners, in defending their
property, start shooting the animals.
Various groups, including
environmental groups concerned about protecting endangered species
as well as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
representatives who are alarmed about such animal treatment, publicly
press their viewpoints. The local mayor and the state’s governor are
widely quoted as deploring the attack on animals but express sympathy
for the farmers’ needs. The appropriate local, state, and federal
government agency personnel are stymied about how to proceed. They
contact you—a mediator or consultant—and ask you to help. They
propose the following process: (a) the intervener should convene
representatives from each of the relevant government agencies at the
federal, state, and local levels to discuss appropriate policy guidelines
and implementing programs; (b) no other stakeholders should be
included in the discussions, since their concerns and aspirations are
already represented among the government personnel; and (c) the
federal government will pay the entire mediator fee.
How would you respond? Put bluntly, to challenge my thesis, should
a mediator be neutral with regard to these matters? My answer: Of
course not.
I would make the decision about going forward by analyzing two
separate questions, one regarding the proposed participants and the
other regarding the payment of mediator fees.
1. Proposed Participants.
I would press each group regarding their claim that they “represent”
the interests of the non-participating stakeholders, wanting to learn
more about how those concerns and interests would and could be
addressed.
It may be that, in the end, the nongovernmental
stakeholders do not participate in the negotiating sessions, and the
participating governmental personnel develop viable ways to elicit and
benefit from their engagement, such as conducting public bargaining
75
sessions, conducting regular press conferences, or creating a website

75. This approach was systematically used in the Kettering Foundation’s Negotiated
Investment Strategy involving federal, state, and local governments during the late-1970s and
1980s. For a discussion of the Negotiated Investment Strategy, see Lawrence Susskind &
Connie Ozawa, Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector: The Planner as Mediator, 4 J.
PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 5, 6 (1984).
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presence to capture public comments.
But let us presume that all the government representatives refuse to
open the conversations to others. They simply say, “We want you to
mediate the conversations in the way that we have proposed. If you do
not wish to do it, we will find someone else.”
What should one do? In my judgment, the mediator or consultant
must decide whether proceeding as proposed operates to exclude other
significant stakeholders from having a meaningful voice in a matter that
might affect them in some notable, perhaps significant way—and, if it
does, whether that raises a due process value that should trump one’s
proceeding with the discussion. Different persons will make different
judgments, but if my assessment were that my participation would
systematically promote coalition building that forecloses other
meaningful opportunities for other affected persons to have voice at
some point in the process, then I would not proceed.
What is crucial to note in this analysis is that the target of the
mediator–consultant’s concern is not the substantive outcome of the
controversy. Rather, it is the integrity of the mediation process as
constituting a fair, just procedure. In my analysis, I would have
concluded that the proposed approach fails to honor the requisite
elements of dignity and respect. What the parties are proposing might
be a process that develops a political resolution to the challenge but it is
not a justice process.
Suppose, though, that a mediator believed that the proposed
approach was acceptable. She must still address the question of whether
having one party to the mediation pay the entire mediator fee comports
with “good process.”
2. Payment of Mediator Fee.
The Model Standards provide some, though not conclusive, guidance
for answering this question. Standard VIII.B.2 provides, “While a
mediator may accept unequal fee payments from the parties, a mediator
should not allow such a fee arrangement to adversely impact the
76
mediator’s ability to conduct a mediation in an impartial manner.” The
concern is clear: if one party pays the mediator’s fee, that mediator may
manipulate the process to promote an outcome sought by that payor—
and that would undermine process integrity. Again, the concern is a

76. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard VIII.B.2 (2005).
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justice concern: not acting impartially undermines the dignity and
respect that the mediator or consultant accords relevant stakeholders,
and being paid by only one stakeholder might motivate the intervener to
press for one particular outcome favored by that group—so neutrality is
also jeopardized. A mediator should not be hesitant—or neutral—when
rejecting such proposed process guidelines.
B. Mediating Within a Process
I asserted above that if a mediator decides to participate in a process
that is acknowledged to be flawed from a justice perspective, she must
still remain neutral with respect to outcome. If the mediator of a childcustody dispute is allotted only forty-five minutes to conduct the
conversation, she still has no warrant for guiding, directing, or pushing
the parties to adopt a particular outcome. Similarly, if the mediator of
the environmental controversy noted above was concerned that not all
stakeholders were adequately represented, it is not her role to shape the
negotiated conversation to increase the likelihood that only one set of
outcomes would be considered. Why?
We object to such mediator conduct on the grounds that it is not the
mediator’s job to determine—and then effectively mandate—the “best”
outcome for the parties. A mediator behaving in that manner is not,
presumptively, what the parties wanted, even in a process that might
otherwise be skewed. If the parties wanted a decision-maker, they could
create a process to deliver it. But what is central to mediation—I
believe its driving value—is that it systematically supports individuals or
groups to exercise their freedom and to take responsibility for making
decisions regarding how they choose to move forward. It requires
engaged participation that leads to outcomes for which each negotiator
is accountable. To promote those central elements, the mediator must
77
remain neutral.
Which brings us full circle.

77. One standard defense of this mediator conduct—even if the mediator community
were generally appalled at it—is, “Well, all the mediator is doing is suggesting what the
parties ought to do—perhaps in very strong language. But the parties are always free to
reject his advice; they can always—and only—agree on what they find acceptable. If they
don’t want it, fine, but proposing it might get them to consider another option that works for
them.” The problem with this retort, of course, is that it defends almost any conduct—with
the claim that parties can always say no.
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IX. CONCLUSION
We promote mediation’s use because we view it as a fundamental,
central procedure for resolving controversies in a democratic society.
We extol it as a process that requires meaningful citizen participation. It
requires each participant to take responsibility both for enhancing one
another’s understanding of the situation and for developing acceptable
outcomes. It not only celebrates but also requires each person—not
someone else—to make a decision for herself as to how the matter
should be resolved.
That is why we cherish mediation. But if the mediator wants to
convert that process into a conversation in which people listen to—and
abide by—what the intervener promotes, we have lost. A mediator
must be neutral because justice demands it.

